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I. General  Remark 
 
The issues that are discussed in the following derive from consultations with Member states of 
the OECD during the June 2000 preparatory meeting. The structure of the paper follows the 
recommendations laid down in the “Issues Note“ of today´s conference organizers. 
 
 
II.  General Meetings in the Corporate Governance Discussion 
 
Only recently the international corporate governance discussion has turned to general meetings 
of shareholders
1. Initially this corporate governance discussion has started from the observation 
of rationally apathetic investors in companies with widely distributed shareholders
2.Where  
protection of (minority) shareholders` interests has been thought to be in need of strengthening, 
the mechanisms discussed and adopted have consisted of developing other means and remedies 
which work around and outside the general meeting like individual and derivative suits, the 
threat of takeover bids, strengthening the board´s and the auditor´s role and the like. If 
shareholder voting and general meetings of shareholders are back on the agenda again today we 
can identify two main reasons for this: 
 
 First, the emergence of institutional shareholders which promises that the classic problems of 
shareholders´ collective action could be mitigated
3 and, 
 second, the lowering of the costs of shareholder voting, communication among shareholders 
and collective activities through modern technologies. 
 
Lawmakers in the developed countries around the world have reacted to these developments by 
encouraging institutional investors to exercise their rights as shareholders and by adapting their 
regulations to the chances of modern communication technology
4. 
There is also however, a third development which seems to work counter intensified shareholder 
activism and a new role for general meetings in corporate governance: the internationalization of 
shareholdings. It makes information of and communication with shareholders, casting votes and 
exercising shareholders´ rights more complicated and costly
5. We´ll have to get back to that 
later
6. 
 
                                                 
1 Cf. Theodor Baums, Shareholder Representation and Proxy Voting in the European Union: A Comparative Study, 
in: K.J. Hopt/ H. Kanda/ M.J. Roe/ E. Wymeersch/ S. Prigge (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance. The State 
of the Art and Emerging Research. Oxford 1998, 545 – 564; T. Baums/ E. Wymeersch (eds.), Shareholder Voting 
Rights and Practices in Europe and the United States. The Hague-London-Boston 1999 (with 20 comparative 
contributions); Jaap W. Winter, Cross-border Voting in Europe, Working Paper, Rotterdam 2000. 
2 Cf. the seminal work of Adolf A. Berle/ Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
...1932; rev. edition 1968; cf. also the early famous essay of Walter Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen. Eine geschäftliche 
Betrachtung. Leipzig 1918. 
3 The literature is abundant; cf. John C. Coffee, Liquidity versus Control. The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 Columbia Law Review 1991, 1277 ff.; Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents. The Promise of  
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. Law Review (1992), 811 ff.; Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak 
Owners, ...1994, at pp. 233 – 253; T. Baums/ R.M. Buxbaum/ K.J. Hopt (eds.), Institutional Investors and Corporate 
Governance. Berlin-New York 1994 (with 23 comparative studies); most recently Roberta Romano, Less is more: 
Making Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of Corporate Governance. Yale Law School, Working Paper # 
241, 2000, with further references. 
4 Cf. references at. V., below. 
5 See International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), Global Share Voting Principles, adopted July 10, 1998, 
cited by  Stephen M. Davis, Bridging the Accountability Gap: An Agenda for Global Voting Reform, in: 
Baums/Wymeersch, op. cit.(n.1), at p. 386 – 389; Corinna Arnold, Voting Abroad: Practical Experiences, in: 
Baums/ Wymeersch, op. cit. (n.1), 391 ff.; Jaap W. Winter, op. cit. (n.1). 
6 Sub  III. 2., below.   3
 
 
 
III.    The Meaning of Voting  
 
Before I turn to the more technical and detailed questions in our “issues note”, some general 
remarks on voting as a principally indispensable right of shareholders should be made. This may 
also serve as an answer to the first question in our issues note. 
Why do shareholders vote, and why should they have the right to vote in corporate affairs?  
First of all, voting is a mode of decision – taking by a plurality of people. Mostly the majority 
rule will be applied as requiring unanimity of all (shareholders) may be difficult to organize and 
unanimity of all voters present could lead to hold-ups by opponents.  If we look at voting from 
the perspective of the division of powers between shareholders and management, shareholders 
have the right to vote mainly for two reasons: 
 
 First, complete contracts cannot be written. There has to be a mechanism to adapt the initial 
“investment contract” (statutes; articles of incorporation and by-laws) to changing 
circumstances. Voting is an inevitable supplement to the incomplete statutory rules
7. There is 
not always the possibility to exit (via an exchange; a takeover by a major shareholder or an 
appraisal right against the company). Leaving the adaptation completely to the management 
could lead to moral hazard problems. Requiring shareholders´ consent for any fundamental 
change in corporate policy limits managerial discretion and thereby serves as a protection 
against moral hazard
8. 
 The latter is also why shareholders may vote on certain control matters (e.g., replacement 
and election of the members of the board of directors/supervisory board members and of the 
auditors). Again, there is not always the possibility for each shareholder to exit as an 
equivalent alternative to voting. And a disinvestment by all shareholders by dissolution of the 
company would mostly be a last-best solution only. 
 
These general remarks leave, of course, plenty of questions open: Where is the simple majority 
rule appropriate, when should a supermajority, and when should even unanimity be required? 
Where should the exact line between the competencies of management and those of the 
shareholders in corporate affairs be drawn? To what extent can management influence the 
decision-making process of shareholders, and to what extent does voting in closely-held and in 
publicly-held companies really matter and contribute to corporate performance? We´ll get back 
to some of these questions later. 
 
 
 
IV.   The Gradual Change of Shareholding Structures 
 
1.  Deconcentration 
 
In 1997 the European Corporate Governance Network (ECGN) submitted its empirical findings 
on “The Separation of Ownership and Control: A Survey of 7 European Countries” to the 
European Commission
9. Not astonishingly, the report found that public companies in continental 
                                                 
7 F.H. Easterbrook/ D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, MA-London 1991, at 
p.11. 
8 F.H. Easterbrook/ D.R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, in: L.A. Bebchuk (ed.), Corporate Law and Economic 
Analysis,...1991, at p. 186. 
9 The Report can be found at www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/   4
Europe were still to a large extent dominated by large shareholders, groups of companies, 
families or the state. But the report also found that a fundamental change is under way in Europe 
today. Stakes of  blockholders, especially of corporations and founding family blockholders, are 
fading, state-owned businesses have been privatized to a large extent, and the share of 
institutional investors, domestic and foreign, is increasing
10. What are the main effects of these 
developments on the shareholders´ meeting? Will these developments change the role and the 
format of the shareholders´ meeting?
11 
 
There is no simple answer to this question. At first glance one could assume that the dissolution 
of blockholdings and the dispersion of shares among “rationally apathetic” investors on the 
capital market will inevitably result in a shift of power onto management. For shareholders´ 
meetings that could mean that their formal competencies will be curbed, that shareholders will be 
less well informed than the former blockholders, and that management will therefore dominate 
the decision - making process also informally. This conclusion would however, miss at least four 
essential points. 
 
 First, “blocks” of shares covers a variety of structures which will not always warrant strong 
influence of shareholders, informed voting and broad competencies of the shareholders´ 
meetings. This may be the case if the block is held by the founding family or a private 
investor. In groups of companies with a pyramidal structure however, ultimate power may lie 
in the hands of the management of a holding company which itself is a widely-held 
corporation with dispersed owners. The same may be true in companies with mutual or 
circular capital interlocks. In state-owned businesses effective control by the shareowners 
will not be always warranted either. 
 Second, depending on the structure and dispersion of shareholdings, control in firms with 
large blockholders will not necessarily be exercised via the formal channel of decisions taken 
by the shareholders in general meetings. Especially if there is one dominant shareholder 
alongside with a minority of small shareholders, the informal influence of the dominant 
shareholder on management will be relevant. The shareholders´ meeting and its 
competencies may then be reduced to taking few formal decisions. 
 Third, as has already been mentioned, refinancing on the capital market rather than through 
families, a group of companies or the state is not synonymous with relying on small private 
investors with poor information and no incentives to exercise shareholders´ rights. In both 
the U.S. and the U.K., for example, the majority of the equities of listed companies are held 
by institutional shareholders, especially by pension funds and insurance companies
12. Market 
forces and supporting regulation may press them to become active shareholders
13. 
 This observation takes us to our next point: The transformation of a system with large 
blockholders into a capital market-oriented system with widely distributed shareowners 
requires the adaptation of the regulatory framework and the development of suitable 
institutions and remedies in order to cope with the specific problems of a widely distributed 
shareownership. The provision of standardized and qualified information to investors, the 
regulation of the proxy voting process and the encouragement of institutional investors to 
exercise their voting rights are but a few examples for this. 
                                                 
10 Marco Becht, Strong Blockholders, Weak Owners and the Need for European Mandatory Disclosure, 1997,         
at p. 14 (www.ulb.ac.be/ecgn/docs/pdf/eu.pdf) 
11 Cf. issues note 3.2. 
12 For the U.S. cf. M.R. Wingerson/ C.H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills, in: 
Baums/Buxbaum/Hopt, op. cit. (n. 3), at p. 203; for the U.K. P. Davies, in: Baums/ Wymeersch, op. cit. (n. 1), at p. 
335. 
13 Cf. for the U.S. R. Romano, op. cit. (n. 3); for the U.K. P. Davies, in: Baums/Wymeersch, op. cit. (n. 1), at p. 335 
– 337; for Germany C. Fraune, Der Einfluß institutioneller Anleger in der Hauptversammlung, Köln-Berlin-Bonn-
München 1996.   5
 
To sum up, if we take the different starting points and the accompanying process of adaptation 
into account, the transformation of a blockholder-dominated into a market-oriented system with 
dispersed owners need not result in an ultimate shift of power onto management. Information to 
shareholders, communication with shareholders, and exercising rights by shareholders will 
certainly look different. But their influence and the role of the shareholders´meeting in particular 
may even gain if we compare it with some forms of blockholder-dominated firms. 
 
2. Internationalization 
 
A second development which accompanies this transformation process and affects all markets is 
the internationalization of shareholdings. How will this trend change the role and the format of 
the shareholders´meeting?
14 Here the actual situation creates specific problems at least for the 
transitional period. The Washington-based Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) has 
up to 1995 surveyed its US institutional clients on how many international proxies they have 
voted. The surveys showed a striking increase in global voting by these investors up to some 
70% in 1995
15. The question, of course, remains whether or not they had received the bulk of 
their international proxies. The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) bemoans 
that there  are barriers in the form of cost, logistics, regulation and law in place which make it 
difficult for foreign investors and institutions to exercise their rights as shareowners
16. Foreign 
investors frequently do not receive proxies in time to make informed voting decisions. Voting 
proxies by foreign investors is costly in some markets. There is the further problem of volume 
which will frequently render any effort to exercise shareholders´ rights costly and inefficient. In 
many markets information to (foreign) shareholders is not sufficient to cast an informed vote. 
Agendas and notices are not accessible in at least one internationally accepted language. Share 
blocking long before and during the shareholders´meeting keeps many foreign investors from 
voting. Companies on new developing markets often do not provide ballots and information on 
the ordinary and extra-ordinary general meetings at all, as the law may be weak and there is no 
regulatory agency overseeing disclosure requirements. Many markets restrict foreigners to 
certain levels of share ownership or to certain levels of voting rights. In some markets beneficial 
shareholders must have their shares registered in their own name rather than in the name of their 
custodian (street name); a costly and often time – consuming process
17. 
 Here market pressure will in the long run help to eliminate these regulatory, legal and informal 
barriers to cross-border investments and their protection through, inter alia, voting. For the 
transitional period however, as long as these barriers are in place, this means less engagement by 
foreign shareholders, lower presence in shareholders´meetings, and higher costs of capital for 
firms from the respective markets. This is certainly an area where recommendations as to the 
adjustment of the legal and regulatory framework by an international body like the OECD would 
be very helpful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Cf. issues note 3.2. 
15 Arnold, op. cit. (n. 5), at p. 392. 
16 Cf. ICGN Principles, cit. supra (n. 5), at p. 387. 
17 Cf. the list of complaints in Arnold, op. cit. (n.5), at pp. 394 – 398; cf. also Winter, op. cit. (n. 1), and the 
recommendations of the ICGN in Davis, op. cit. (n. 5), at pp. 387, 388.   6
 
V. Information  Technology 
 
How may new information technology be used to improve the functioning of the shareholders´ 
meeting in terms of information dissemination, voting procedures (including proxies), etc.? Have 
any concrete steps been taken in this direction?
18 
In the United States, both Delaware corporate law and the securities laws permit electronic 
corporate-shareholder communication and proxy-voting
19. In 1995 the S.E.C. formally 
recognized that technology has opened important new channels of communication between 
shareholders and management, and issued an interpretative release promoting electronic 
corporate-shareholder communication
20. Although the vast majority of corporations still use 
paper-based methods of information disclosure and voting, many have begun to use electronic 
media
21. ADP (Automatic Data Processing), the biggest proxy service company in the US, has 
set up a separate website which investors can access by using numerical codes
22. ADP reports 
that for 1,000 American publicly listed companies 6% of the proxy votes were cast via the 
internet or by telephone in 1999. It is expected that this figure will double in 2000
23. 
 
Other legislations have followed suit. Australian Corporations Law for instance permits the 
lodgment of proxies by electronic means
24. The Australian Companies & Securities Advisory 
Committee recommends in its  final report of June of this year that the Corporations Law should 
permit the directors of a listed public company to provide for direct absentee voting. This 
discretion would allow companies to introduce electronic voting
25. 
 
Germany has a couple of weeks ago changed its Stock Corporation Act
26. Shareholders may be 
provided with reports, meeting notices etc. via e-mail and cast their votes electronically. This 
will not be direct absentee voting; rather, the investor´s bank or broker will as his or her proxy 
receive electronic instructions which may – if the technology provides for that – still be given 
during the meeting. For the investor there is no difference compared to direct absentee voting. 
 
Similarly, the Department of Trade and Industry of the United Kingdom is about to issue a 
Statutory Instrument Order which will legitimise the use of electronic communications between 
shareholders and companies
27. This means that companies will be allowed to send out company 
information by e-mail (e.g. meeting notices, reports & accounts, proxy forms, etc), post all this 
information on their websites for shareholders to read it and take it off the site for personal use. It 
also allows proxy votes to be returned by shareholders to the company or its registrar.
28 
 
                                                 
18 Issues note 3.3. 
19 Del. Gen.Corp.L.§§ 212 (c)(1)-(2) (1996); for the securities laws cf. the following footnote. 
20 S.E.C., Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Sec. Act Release 33-7233, Exchange Act Release 34-
36345, Release No. IC-21399, 1995 WL 588462 (Oct. 6, 1995). 
21 Cf. M.Klausner/J.Elfenbein, The United States (National Report), in: Baums/Wymeersch, op. cit. (n. 1), at p. 362. 
22 www.proxyvote.com 
23 Cf. J.P.Morgan, Internet voting and the delivery of shareholder communications, March 2000, at p. 2. 
24 ss 250B,250BA. 
25 Companies & Securities Advisory Committee, Shareholder participation in the modern listed public company. 
Final Report, June 2000, at p. 74 f and Appendix 2 (List of Recommendations). 
26 Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung, as of Nov. 16, 2000 (not yet published). 
27 The draft of “The Companies Act 1995 (Electronic Communications) Order 2000” can be found at 
www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/draft/20008674.htm. 
28 Cf. the two consultation documents of the DTI of March 1999 (“Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce-A 
Consultation Document” and “Electronic Communication: Change to the Companies Act 1985), furthermore ICSA 
(Institute for Company Secretaries and Administrators), Electronic Communications with Shareholders. A Guide to 
Recommended Best Practice, 2000.   7
While this survey is certainly not comprehensive, it still seems correct to assume that the 
development in many other OECD states has not yet reached that stage. Traditional company law 
prescribes that the general meeting has to take place at a location where shareholders or their 
representatives meet physically. Many laws provide that the proxy or, if voting by mail is 
permitted, the vote has to be in writing. Electronic voting or authorising a proxy electronically is 
not admitted in most countries
29. 
Technology allows for further variations of the traditional shareholders´meeting and opens up 
completely new perspectives on how shareholders could participate in the future. One model 
would be one or more “satellite meetings” in other locations. The proceedings at the main site 
would be displayed on a screen and could be followed by the participants in “satellite meetings” 
who could then cast their votes electronically. In smaller firms shareholders could like board 
members communicate and take conclusions in a video conference. We´ll perhaps also see 
complete shareholders´meetings in the cyberspace in the future.
30 In any event, technology will 
drive costs of communication with domestic and foreign investors dramatically down, and the 
hampering requirement of physical presence of either the shareholder personally or his/her proxy 
can be repealed. 
Technology will offer even more. Let me mention only two points. In order to facilitate user 
friendly access and viewing of the public companies documents, states or even the European 
Community could evaluate the model that has emerged in the U.S. (EDGAR database), i.e. a 
central database which could serve not only for regulatory filing requirements but also as a 
central depository for electronically filed documents that can be used for the electronic delivery 
of meeting materials and a mechanism to allow for the electronic voting of shares.  
Another issue concerns informed  voting. So far, even with electronic voting, the individual 
investor gets the management´s (or his bank´s) voting proposal. The key problem of the 
uninformed and “rationally apathetic” shareholder is only addressed in that he or she need not fill 
in a proxy in writing, tick the box whether or not he is willing to follow the management´s 
proposals by hand and send it back by mail. In the future, institutional investors could make their 
voting recommendations available to individual investors by internet. The investor could see 
these recommendations alongside with those of the management on his electronic proxy form 
and take his choice. The incentives for such professional proxy voting advisors and the 
preconditions for a  competition for shareholder-oriented proxy voting advisory services are 
discussed in the literature
31. 
 
 
VI.       Competence of the Shareholders´ Meeting 
 
How should the general competence of the shareholders´ meeting be defined? Should it be 
designated to deal with a limited and defined set of issues or, as a principle, be able to serve as 
the ultimate decision making body on virtually all company matters? Is it possible to identify any 
shifts in responsibilities among different company organs, such as the shareholders´ meeting, the 
board and executive management?
32 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Cf. the national reports on the legal systems within the European Union in Baums/Wymeersch, op. cit. (n. 1). 
30 Cf. U. Noack, Unternehmensrecht und Internet, Working Paper, Universität Düsseldorf/Germany, 2000, with 
further references. 
31 T.Baums/Ph.v.Randow, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance: The German Experience and a New 
Approach, in: M. Aoki/H.K. Kim (eds.), Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies. EDI Development 
Studies, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 1995, 435, 451 ff.; M. Latham, The Internet Will Drive Corporate 
Monitoring, 2000 (www.corpmon.com);with further references. 
32 Issues note 3.4.   8
1.  Different  technical approaches 
 
 Internationally we find different approaches to the question how to define the competencies of 
the shareholders´meeting and delimit them from those of the board. In Sweden, for example, the 
shareholders´ meeting is – at least in principle – able to serve as the ultimate decision making 
body on virtually all company matters whereas in Germany there is a designed set of issues on 
which the shareholders may decide
33. In the U.S. some competencies of the shareholders´ 
meeting are indispensable, others depend on the articles of incorporation
34. For listed companies 
the respective stock exchange may require that certain important decisions be put before the 
shareholders
35. In the U.K., there is a number of situations in which the Companies Act of 1985 
or the London Stock Exchange require major transactions to be ratified in general meeting
36. The 
general meeting may also curtail the future powers of the directors as to the management of the 
company by a special resolution, and it has “default powers”
37. 
The German example may be particularly interesting as Germany has experimented with 
different approaches. Under the old Commercial Code (until 1937), the shareholders´ meeting 
was considered to be – at least in theory – the supreme organ of the company with broad 
competencies. Practice and statutes however, looked very different also then, of course. Since 
1937, the Stock Corporation Code reserves a defined set of competencies to the general meeting. 
This set is mandatory which means that the statutes must not, even not in smaller companies, 
deviate. Under this regime, the shareholders´ meeting must not compel the directors to enter or 
not to enter into a transaction which is clearly a part of the general management of the 
company´s business except of cases where management has asked for such a decision
38.  
Basically, there are two problems with this regulation. First, it applies also to small non-listed 
stock corporations
39. Here there are no convincing reasons conceivable why shareholders should 
not be free to tailor the competencies of the shareholders´ meeting and the board according to 
their needs. Family-owned businesses as well as start-up companies in the form of a stock 
corporation are therefore forced to develop accompanying shareholder agreements which makes 
things more complicated than they need be
40. 
The second problem with this mandatory catalogue of competencies is that it proved to be 
incomplete. The Federal Civil Court found that the spinning-off of an essential part of a 
company´s  assets into a subsidiary requires the consent of the shareholders although the 
wording of the respective paragraph (§ 119 AktG) does not provide for that
41. There is a lot of 
literature guessing when exactly this “Holzmüller”-doctrine is applicable and whether it should 
be extended on other similar important transactions. Accordingly, corporate practice is confused. 
The Government Commission on Corporate Governance is right now considering whether and 
how to amend this. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Cf. § 119 German Stock Corporation Act. 
34 Cf., e.g., R.C. Clark, Corporate Law, Boston – Toronto 1986, at p. 94.  
35 See N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual § 312. 01. 
36 Cf. P. Davies, in: Gower´s  Principles of Modern Company Law, 6
th ed., London 1997, at pp. 626 et seq. 
37 Davies, op. cit., at p. 186, 187. 
38 Cf. § 119 (2) Stock Corporation Act. 
39 As opposed to limited liability companies (GmbH) where shareholders hold the reins. 
40 Cf. T.Baums/M.Möller, Venture Capital: US-amerikanisches Modell und deutsches Aktienrecht, in: 
T.Baums/K.J.Hopt/N.Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law. Liber amicorum Richard 
M. Buxbaum, London-The Hague-Boston, 2000, 33 – 87. 
41 BGHZ 83, 122 (“Holzmüller”-case). For a description and assessment in English cf. Rosengarten, in: 
Baums/Hopt/Horn, op. cit. (n.40), 445 –460.   9
 
2.  Shifts in responsibilities 
 
The second part of the question – is it possible to identify any shifts in responsibilities among 
different company organs, such as the shareholders´ meeting, the board and executive 
management? - is difficult to answer. A precise and comprehensive answer would not only 
require a detailed study of the various legal systems including the differences between one-tier 
and two-tier board systems but also of the actual practice. My general impression is that, for 
instance, U.S. company practice leaves more decisions to management like, e.g., amendments of 
the by-laws, decisions on mergers up to a certain size, short form mergers, share issuances and 
share repurchase programs as well as antitakeover measures than traditional continental 
European company law would allow. On the other hand, U.S. company and securities laws and 
judicial practice provide for an effective protection of investors should the board abuse its 
powers. More flexibility need not necessarily mean less shareholder protection. 
 
 
VII. Majority  Requirements 
 
Under what circumstances should deviations from the simple majority rule be mandated? What 
is the underlying reason and guiding principle for such deviations? Is there a real risk that super 
majority requirements in the case of dispersed ownership and low participation rates may stall 
the decision making process making it practically impossible to obtain the required majority?
42 
 
1.  Plurality and supermajority requirements 
 
The predominant rule as to the majority legally required for general meeting decisions is the 
absolute majority of the votes present, equaling voting abstention to negative voting
43. Some 
countries however, let the simple majority suffice
44.The articles of incorporation or the bylaws 
may provide for other “supermajorities” however; or such a supermajority is even required by 
mandatory law. Such supermajority rules are thought as an instrument of protection of minority 
interests, but they may also lie in the interest of the management. Take a close corporation under, 
say, Delaware company law. If the articles of incorporation provide for a supermajority of two 
thirds of the shares of the company to elect board members, a minority shareholder with 40% of 
the outstanding stock has a say in who will be elected. In  a public corporation such a 
supermajority requirement may serve as one out of several devices to make the acquisition of 
control by a hostile bidder difficult. 
Apart from such voluntary statutory provisions, company laws frequently mandate 
supermajorities for fundamental changes like, e.g., mergers, dissolutions, sale of all assets of the 
company and the like
45. The rationale for these mandatory rules is that investors shall be 
confident that the initial “investment contract” cannot be altered without their approval. 
Requiring unanimity in such a case could, of course, lead to inefficient hold-ups. Therefore legal 
systems frequently provide, beside the supermajority requirement, for appraisal rights for 
opposing shareholders. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Issues note 3.5. 
43 E.g., Finland, France, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland, U.S.; cf. N. Druey, General Report, in: 
Baums/Wymeersch, op. cit. (n. 1), at p. 377. 
44 Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, U.K.; cf. Druey at p. 377 f. 
45 Cf. the detailed report by Druey, op. cit., at p. 378.   10
 
2. Quorum  requirements 
 
There is no danger that (super-)majority requirements will in the case of dispersed ownership 
and low participation rates stall the decision making process as long as the (super-) majority 
refers to the stock voted or the shares present at the meeting rather than to all outstanding shares. 
This danger exists however, if a legal system requires a quorum of presence. In this point legal 
systems differ. Many countries do not know any legal minima of shareholders to be present at 
the meeting
46. Others have very low statutory provisions
47. Mediterranean countries however, 
have substantial limits
48 and respective problems, leading partially to the practice that a second 
or even third meeting is routinely convened together with the first one. In this second or third 
meeting, no quora are applicable. 
In the U.S., a quorum is also required. Under Delaware law, for example, the certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws of a corporation may specify the number of voting shares that must be 
represented at a meeting in order to constitute a quorum. In no event, however, may a quorum 
consist of less than one-third of the shares outstanding. If the certificate of incorporation or 
bylaws do not specify how many shares constitute a quorum, then a quorum is a majority of the 
shares outstanding
49. It is reported that corporations in the U.S. commonly achieve quorums 
(through participation of proxy-holders) averaging more than 80 percent of outstanding shares
50. 
 
 
VIII.   Nomination and Election of the Board of Directors 
 
What is generally law and practice when it comes to the nomination and election of the board of 
directors? What is the experience from nomination committees, cumulative voting rights and 
minority representation?
51 
 
1.  Election of directors 
 
Here one has of course to differentiate between one- and two-tier systems. In the predominant 
one-tier model, shareholders will generally have the right to elect the members of the board. Let 
us take the English law as an example
52. The Company Act of 1985 leaves it to the articles of 
association whether or not all members of the board are elected by all shareholders in a general 
meeting. There is nothing to prevent articles providing that directors can be appointed by a 
particular class of shareholders, by debenture holders or, indeed by third parties. In the regular 
case of appointment by the shareholders´ meeting an ordinary resolution will suffice to elect a 
director. The articles normally provide for retirement by rotation of a certain proportion and for 
the filling of the vacancies at each general meeting. However appointed, a director can be 
removed by ordinary resolution in addition to any other means of removal that may be provided 
in the articles. 
Things look quite different in two-tier systems. In the Dutch model, if a (bigger) company is 
submitted to the “structure regime”, the members of the supervisory board will be supplemented 
                                                 
46 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,; cf. Druey, op. cit., at 
p. 377. 
47 Ireland, Portugal, U.K.; Druey at p. 377. 
48 France, Greece, Italy, Portugal (for extraordinary meetings), Spain, and Luxembourg (for extraordinary meetings); 
cf. Druey, at p. 377. 
49 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 216 (1996). 
50 Klausner/Elfenbein, op. cit. (n. 21), at p. 360. 
51 Issues note 3.6. 
52 The following is taken from Davies, op. cit. (n. 36), at p. 180, 181.   11
by co-optation
53. The Dutch government is right now considering whether this co-optation model 
should be abandoned. 
Under the German codetermination model,
54 part of the members of the supervisory board is 
appointed by (representatives of) the employees and at least  - depending on the Act which is 
applicable – half of the members will be elected by the (plurality of) shareholders. The statutes 
may provide that a third of the representatives of the shareholders be appointed by a single 
shareholder or a class of shareholders
55. Representatives of shareholders can be removed by 
ordinary resolution without cause with a ¾ majority of the votes; the statutes may provide for an 
other majority
56. The representatives of the employees may be removed by their electorate. The 
supervisory board itself can also ask the court for removal of a member for cause
57. 
 
2.  Nomination of directors 
 
Here again one has to differentiate between one-tier and two-tier systems, and board practices 
have to be taken into account. 
In the predominant one-tier system, it is up to the board to make proposals to the shareholders as 
to the election of board-members. With insider-(management-)dominated boards and rationally 
apathetic shareholders, this system formerly resulted frequently in factual co-optation by the 
incumbent management. The discussion during the last two decades or so and the development 
of codes of best practice in particular seem to have brought about change in this respect. These 
codes recommend nomination subcommittees of the board with a majority of independent 
(outside) directors as their members. These committees have to develop proposals how to 
supplement the board
58. The aim is to appoint truly independent individuals to boards so that 
they can fulfill their role and objectively oversee company management. Of course it will 
factually depend to a large extent on the shareholding structure how the composition of the board 
(and hence the recommendations of the nomination committee) will look like. Dominant or even 
majority shareholders will quite naturally be represented on boards; board composition will still 
mirror business relationships; and in companies with widely distributed shares managing 
directors will play an important if not decisive role. 
In the German two-tier system things look different as up to a half of the board seats may be 
taken by employees´ representatives. As to the other half the board itself will make proposals to 
the shareholders´ meeting whom to elect.
59. Nomination committees (with the task of developing 
proposals for the composition of the supervisory board) are widely unknown in German 
companies. Boards use to mirror the shareholding structure and composition (representatives of 
controlling shareholders; bankers as representatives of the proxy –voting banks; representatives 
of important business partners; leading business figures from other firms; the former CEO). 
Recently the German Panel on Corporate Governance has in its Code of Best Practice developed 
                                                 
53 Cf. H.J.M.N. Honée, Erfahrungen mit der Kooptation von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern in den Niederlanden, ZGR-
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1982, 87 ff. 
54 For a description of the different models and their regulation cf. T.Baums/B. Frick, The Market Value of the 
Codetermined Firm, in: M.Blair/M.J.Roe (eds.), Employees and Corporate Governance, Washington D.C. 1999, at 
pp. 208 – 210; for a description of the historical development K.Pistor in the same volume at pp. 163 ff.; critical 
assessment by M.J. Roe, same vol., at pp. 194 ff. 
55 § 101 (2) Stock Corporation Act. 
56  § 103 (1) Stock Corporation Act. 
57 § 103 (2) Stock Corporation Act. 
58 Cf., e.g., Spain: El Gobierno de las Sociedades, 1998, at 5.1,5.2; Belgium: Belgische Commissie voor Corporate 
Governance, Verslag 1998, n. 24; France: CNPF/AFEP: Le Conseil dÁdministration des Sociétés Cotées 1995, II.5.; 
U.K. (Hampel) : Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report, 1998, A.V.,VI. 
59 § 124 (3)(1) Stock Corporation Act.   12
recommendations for a more independent composition of boards
60. The recommendations of the 
Dutch “Peters Committee” point in the same direction
61. 
 
3.  Cumulative voting rights 
 
Under cumulative voting, shareholders may vote their shares multiple times up to the number of 
vacancies to be filled. They can cast all their multiple votes for a single candidate or apportion 
them among different candidates in any manner
62. The rationale of cumulative voting is to assist 
minority shareholders to secure some representation on the board of directors. The greater the 
number of vacancies, the higher the possibility of minority shareholders securing some 
representation by focusing their multiple votes on the same one or few candidates. By contrast, 
under non-cumulative voting, a majority shareholder, or a group of shareholders, could 
determine all positions of the board.  
Cumulative voting is mandatory for public companies in some jurisdictions in the United 
States
63. It is permissible in most other U.S. jurisdictions, if authorized by the constitution of the 
company
64. There is a continuing debate in the U.S. about whether cumulative voting should be 
mandatory for public companies. Elsewhere, cumulative voting may be permissible, as in 
Canada, Australia, and the U.K., but seems not to be in use. To my knowledge only few 
continental European legal systems provide for cumulative voting (e.g., Italy for formerly state-
owned companies).  
As a practical matter, the introduction of cumulative voting requires provisions as to the removal 
of a director elected through cumulative voting. To a certain extent cumulative voting can also 
be undermined through changing the size of the board or the introduction of staggered boards
65. 
The strongest argument for cumulative voting is that it provides large minority shareholder with 
a “look-in” at the board. Today, it may also provide access to the boardroom for activist 
institutions, who will then serve as virtual representatives for other public shareholders
66. The 
customary argument against cumulative voting is that it is likely to polarize the board. Practical 
experience has also shown that big institutionals and shareholder activists or private investors 
need not necessarily have the mechanism of cumulative voting at hand in order to get a board 
seat. Critics also point at other devices for keeping minority shareholders interested and 
informed
67. Empirical data on the (positive or negative) effect of cumulative voting are 
inconclusive
68. 
                                                 
60 German Panel of Corporate Governance, Code of Best Practice for German Corporate Governance, July 2000, at 
III.1.). 
61 Corporate Governance in the Netherlands. Forty Recommendations, 1997, sub 2.1 – 2.7. 
62 Briefly, the number of votes which each shareholder has is multiplied by the number of directors to be elected and 
he can “cumulate” his votes on one or some nominees only instead of spreading them over the slate. This is of little 
benefit to a member with a handful of votes only but it does mean that one who holds one-third of the voting shares 
should secure one-third representation on the board and that one with 51 percent should secure only one-half and 
not, as under the majority-rule, be able to elect the whole board (Davies, op. cit. (n. 36), at p. 181). U.S. 
commentators on cumulative voting have developed formulae to determine the minimum number of shares needed 
to elect a director if those shares are cumulated in one candidate (R.C. Clark, op. cit. (n. 34), at p. 363). The critical 
percentage for election as director depends on the number to be elected at a meeting. The higher the number of 
directors, the lower the percentage shareholding required. Conversely, the lower the number of directors, the higher 
the percentage shareholding required. 
63 For instance, California. 
64 E.g., Delaware, New York. 
65 For a more extensive discussion cf. R.C. Clark, op. cit. (n. 34), at pp. 364 ff.; J.H. Choper/J.C. Coffee/R.J. Gilson, 
Cases and Materials on Corporations, 4
th ed. 1995, at p. 572 f.; comparative monograph: P. Beyer, 
Minderheitsvertreter im Aufsichtsrat, Baden-Baden 2001. 
66 Cf. J. Gordon, Institutions As Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, Columbia Law Rev. 94 
(1994), 124, 128 f. 
67 Cf. Choper/Coffee/Gilson, op. cit. (n. 65), at p. 574. 
68 Cf. Choper/Coffee/Gilson at p. 575.   I
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